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New Hampshire’s Claremont Case and the Separation of
Powers
EDWARD C. MOSCA*
I. INTRODUCTION
Court decisions involving the adequacy of public education raise some
obvious separation of powers problems. These include the institutional
competency of courts to determine what level of education is adequate and
how much funding is necessary to reach that level, and the authority of
courts to enforce such judgments. This article will examine these problems
through New Hampshire’s serial education funding litigation, the Claremont case.1

* Edward C. Mosca is an attorney in private practice. He has a special interest in appellate and
constitutional law.
1. I use the phrase “Claremont case” to refer to the line of cases that commenced with Claremont
Sch. Dist. v. Gov., 635 A.2d 1375 (N.H. 1993) and Claremont Sch. Dist. v. Gov., 703 A.2d 1353 (N.H.
1997). These initial decisions are generally known as Claremont I and Claremont II, which is how I
will refer to them. I count, and will refer to, the challenge to Justice Batchelder’s participation in
Claremont II as Claremont III (Claremont Sch. Dist. v. Gov., 712 A.2d 612 (N.H. 1998)); the advisory
opinion on former Governor Shaheen’s “ABC” education funding plan as Claremont IV (Opinion of the
Justices (School Financing),712 A.2d 1080 (N.H. 1998)); the State’s request for an extension to implement a new education funding system as Claremont V (Claremont Sch. Dist. v. Gov., 725 A.2d 648
(N.H. 1998)); the advisory opinion on the constitutionality of a proposed tax plan referendum as
Claremont VI (Opinion of the Justices (School Financing), 725 A.2d 1082 (N.H. 1999)); the Claremont
plaintiffs’ challenge to a “phase-in” in certain communities of the state property tax as Claremont VII
(Claremont Sch. Dist. v. Gov., 744 A.2d 1107 (N.H. 1999)); the Claremont plaintiffs’ successful request for attorney’s fees as Claremont VIII (Claremont Sch. Dist. v. Gov., 761 A.2d 389 (N.H. 1999));
the advisory opinion on a targeted aid plan proposed by former State Senator Fred King as Claremont
IX (Opinion of the Justices (Reformed Public School Financing System), 765 A.2d 673 (N.H. 2000));
the decision upholding the constitutionality of the state property tax as Claremont X (Sirrell v. State,
780 A.2d 494 (N.H. 2001)); and the “accountability decision” as Claremont XI (Claremont Sch. Dist. v.
Gov., 794 A.2d 744 (N.H. 2002)). Commentators have truncated matters by referring to the accountability decision, which I refer to as Claremont XI, as Claremont III. See e.g. John Dayton & Anne
Dupre, School Funding Litigation: Who’s Winning the War?, 57 Vand. L. Rev. 2351, 2395 (2004)
(stating that “In Claremont III, the court declared that ‘accountability is an essential component of the
State’s [constitutional] duty and . . . the existing statutory scheme has deficiencies that are inconsistent
with the State’s duty to provide a constitutionally adequate education’”). This, however, does not give
a true sense of the serial nature of the litigation. Indeed, while not discussed in this article, there has
also been a Claremont XII (Baines v. N.H. Sen. Pres., 876 A.2d 768 (N.H. 2005)) (rejecting challenge
to process used to pass education funding law), and a Claremont XIII (Hughes v. Speaker of N.H. H.R.,
876 A.2d 736 (N.H. 2005)) (rejecting challenge to process used to pass education funding law). More
importantly, Claremont XIV (Londonderry Sch. Dist. SAU #12 & a. v. N.H., Case No. 2006-0258 (Apr.
19, 2006)), which involves the question of whether education funding legislation is unconstitutional
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While Claremont I, which announced that the State has a duty to provide an adequate education and to guarantee adequate funding, was unanimously decided,2 the New Hampshire Supreme Court’s extension of that
holding to require a particular definition of an adequate education in
Claremont II,3 and later to require “standards of accountability” in Claremont XI,4 provoked dissenting opinions that charged that the majority had
violated the separation of powers.5
In each case, the majority’s response was to summarily deny any violation. In Claremont II, the majority stated, “[w]e agree with [dissenting]
Justice Horton that we were not appointed to establish educational policy. .
. . That is why we leave such matters . . . to the two co-equal branches of
government.”6 Similarly, in Claremont XI, in which two of the five justices dissented, the majority stated, “[w]e recognize that we are not appointed to establish educational policy and have not done so today.”7 Unfortunately, summarily denying that the Court had violated the separation
of powers was the extent to which the majority examined the issue, while
the dissent’s treatment was only slightly less superficial. This article will
attempt to help fill this void.8
I will start by briefly reviewing the history of education funding litigation because this context is essential to understanding the Claremont case.9
I will then undertake a limited review of the Claremont case. Finally, I
will consider Claremont from the standpoint of the separation of powers. I
begin by examining the text and structure of the State Constitution and
then consider whether there are judicially discoverable and manageable
standards for determining what level of education is adequate and how
much funding is necessary to reach that level. Because there is a textually
demonstrable commitment of education funding and education policy to
because it does not define an adequate education and determine its cost based on such a definition, and
thus squarely involves the separation of powers, is now before the Supreme Court.
2. 635 A.2d at 1382.
3. 703 A.2d at 1359.
4. 794 A.2d at 745.
5. Claremont II, 703 A.2d at 1362-63 (Horton, J., dissenting); Claremont XI, 794 A.2d at 761-63
(Nadeau and Dalianis, JJ., dissenting).
6. Claremont II, 703 A.2d at 1360.
7. 794 A.2d at 760. Note that one of the dissenters, Justice Nadeau, retired in December 2005.
8. This article is not the first examination of the Claremont case from the standpoint of the separation of powers. In Letters to the Educators, Attorney Eugene Van Loan III, writing under the pseudonym Rasputin, examined the topic as part of a comprehensive critique of the Claremont case. Eugene
Van Loan III, Letters to the Educators, http://www.mainstream.net/nhpolitics (accessed May 22, 2006).
9. See Andru H. Volinsky, New Hampshire’s Education-Funding Litigation: Claremont School
District v. Governor, 83 Neb. L. Rev. 836, 844 (2005) (“Our experience in New Hampshire with the
Claremont case is representative of the state-constitution-based school-funding litigation that has
developed across the nation in response to the United States Supreme Court’s decision in San Antonio
Independent School District v. Rodriguez.”).
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the legislative branch, and because what an adequate education comprises
and costs are quintessentially political questions, Claremont represents a
clear trespass on legislative powers and should be overruled.
II. CLAREMONT IN CONTEXT
Education funding litigation is not unique to New Hampshire. According to the Campaign for Educational Equity,10 as of November 2005,
“[l]awsuits challenging state methods of funding public schools have been
brought in [forty-five] of the [fifty] states.”11
The Claremont case is part of what has been called the “third wave” of
school funding litigation.12 The first wave began in the late 1960s,13 and
involved challenges under the federal equal protection clause.14 The first
successful case was in 1971, when the California Supreme Court held that
education was a fundamental right and was violated by “substantial disparities among school districts in the amount of revenue available for education” in Serrano v. Priest.15
The first wave was short-lived. In 1973, the United States Supreme
Court held that education was not a fundamental right under the federal
10. Information regarding the Campaign for Educational Equity can be found at its website “Access,” at http://www.schoolfunding.info (accessed May 22, 2006). It was formed in June 2005 by
Teachers College, Columbia University. Teachers College’s President Michael Levine in launching the
organization “explained that the new campaign is designed to overcome the gap in educational access
and achievement between America’s most and least advantaged students. ‘We consider ‘the gap’ to be
the educational equivalent of AIDS or cancer in medicine,’ he said.” Access, Michael Rebell Will Lead
“Campaign for Educational Equity” at Teachers College, http://www.schoolfunding.info/news/policy/
6-16-05rebelltotc.php3 (June 16, 2005). The website of the Claremont plaintiffs also refers to “the
gap.” New Hampshire Citizens’ Voice Project, A Statewide Community Dialogue About Quality Education, http://www.nhcvp.org/fundgap.php (accessed May 22, 2006).
11. The Access website reports that the only states not to have undergone education funding litigation are Delaware, Hawaii, Mississippi, Nevada and Utah. http://www.schoolfunding.info/litigation/
litigation.php3 (accessed May 22, 2006).
12. Commentators have described “three waves” of school funding litigation. Michael Heise, State
Constitutions, School Finance Litigation, and the “Third Wave”: From Equity to Adequacy, 68 Temp.
L. Rev. 1151, 1152 (1995); see William E. Thro, Judicial Analysis During the Third Wave of School
Finance Litigation: the Massachusetts Decision as a Model, 35 B.C. L. Rev. 597, 598 (1994) (“challenges to the school finance systems of the various states can be divided into three distinct ‘waves’ of
cases”); see also William S. Koski, Of Fuzzy Standards and Institutional Constraints: a Reexamination of the Jurisprudential History of Educational Finance Reform Litigation, 43 Santa Clara
L. Rev. 1185, 1188 (2003).
13. Burrus v. Wilkerson, 310 F. Supp. 572 (W.D. Va. 1969), aff’d, 397 U.S. 44 (1970); McInnis v.
Shapiro, 293 F. Supp. 327 (N.D. Ill. 1968), aff’d sub. nom. McInnis v. Oglive, 394 U.S. 322 (1969); see
Koski, supra n. 12, at 1213-14.
14. Koski, supra n. 12, at 1188 (“[S]chool finance litigation initially focused on the federal Constitution’s Equal Protection Clause and was fueled by the argument that per-student funding should be
substantially equal or at least not dependent upon the wealth of the school district in which the student
resided.”).
15. 487 P.2d 1241, 1265 (Cal. 1971).
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Constitution in San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez,16
and applied rational basis review to uphold the challenged education funding system.17 In his dissent, Justice Marshall encouraged prospective litigants to turn to state constitutions to achieve their objectives, urging that
“nothing in the Court’s decision today should inhibit further review of state
educational funding schemes under state constitutional provisions.”18
The second wave broke almost immediately after Rodriguez when the
New Jersey Supreme Court issued Robinson v. Cahill,19 which held that
spending disparities between school districts violated the New Jersey Constitution’s education clause, which required “a thorough and efficient system of free public schools.”20 Second wave litigation sought equalized per
pupil spending based on state education clauses, particularly equal protection clauses.21 For example, in 1976, the California Supreme Court reaffirmed the result in Serrano under the state constitution’s equal protection
clause.22
The third wave began in 1989 with cases such as the Supreme Court of
Kentucky’s Rose v. Council for Better Education,23 and involved a shift
from “equity” to “adequacy.” Rather than seeking to equalize spending
among school districts based on equal protection arguments, third wave
litigation maintained that the education clauses of state constitutions required a minimum level of education and that the state is required to provide a level of funding that is adequate to provide that education.24
The shift was politically motivated. Equity litigation created winners
and losers because it caused wealth to be transferred from richer to poorer
school districts. Naturally, the school districts whose pieces of the education funding pie got thinner were not happy.25 In contrast, by seeking to

16. 411 U.S. 1, 33 (1973) (“It is not the province of this Court to create substantive constitutional
rights in the name of guaranteeing equal protection of the laws.”).
17. Id. at 49-55 (concluding that “local control” was a sufficient state interest to satisfy rational
basis review).
18. Id. at 138 n. 100 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Allegedly, Marshall described his judicial philosophy as “you do what you think is right and let the law catch up.” Mark R. Levin, Men in Black: How
the Supreme Court is Destroying America 17 (Regnery Publg., Inc. 2005).
19. 303 A.2d 273 (N.J. 1973).
20. Id. at 294.
21. See Koski, supra n. 12, at 1191; Heise, supra n. 12, at 1152; Thro, supra n.12, at 603.
22. Serrano v. Priest, 557 P.2d 929, 957-58 (Cal. 1976).
23. 790 S.W.2d 186 (Ky. 1989).
24. See Koski, supra n. 12, at 1192; Heise, supra n. 12, at 1153; Thro, supra n. 12, at 603.
25. A well known example in New Hampshire of the political unpopularity of equity litigation is the
effort by Killington to secede from Vermont and join New Hampshire. See e.g. Daniel Barrick, Vermonters Persist in Desire to Move, Concord Monitor B1 (Feb. 2, 2005).
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enlarge the size of the pie, adequacy litigation created the impression that
everyone was a winner.26
Adequacy litigation is considerably more policy laden than equity litigation. Once a court has determined that education is a fundamental right,
the court’s subsequent review is limited to whether there is equal per pupil
spending. Adequacy litigation, on the other hand, requires a court to determine what level of education is adequate and how much funding is necessary to reach that level. Thus, adequacy litigation raises concerns about
the institutional competence of courts to make such judgments and the
authority of courts to enforce such judgments.27
Nevertheless, the results of third wave litigation have heavily favored
plaintiffs. According to the Campaign for Educational Equity, plaintiffs
have triumphed in twenty-one states and lost in only seven states.28 Where
plaintiffs have lost, courts have held that questions regarding educational
adequacy are not justiciable because they are political questions. For example, in Coalition for Adequacy & Fairness, Inc. v. Chiles,29 the Florida
Supreme Court held that “plaintiffs failed to demonstrate . . . an appropriate standard for determining ‘adequacy’ of support provided by state that
would not present a substantial risk of judicial intrusion into the powers” of
the representative branches.30 In contrast, the high courts of other states,
26. See Koski, The Politics of Judicial Decision-Making in Educational Policy Reform, 55 Hastings
L.J. 1077, 1198 n. 554 (2004) (“Adequacy was seen as a more politically appealing theory of reform
that would permit the big spenders to continue spending big, while at the same time ensuring an adequate education for all school children.”).
27. But see Larry J. Obhof, Rethinking Judicial Activism and Restraint in State School Finance
Litigation, 27 Harv. J.L. & Pub. Policy 569, 583 (2004) (“The adequacy standard is perhaps also more
palatable to legal commentators and the public because it intrudes less upon the principle of separation
of powers. It is one thing to find that a system does not meet the constitutionally required minimum
standard and is therefore unconstitutional until it is improved to meet that standard. This is the fundamental function of courts: to say what the law is.”).
28. Supra n. 10. Massachusetts and Texas are listed as both winners and losers.
29. 680 So. 2d 400 (Fla. 1996).
30. Id. at 408. See Comm. for Educ. Rights v. Edgar, 672 N.E.2d 1178, 1191 (Ill. 1996) (“It would
be a transparent conceit to suggest that whatever standards of quality courts might develop would
actually be derived from the constitution in any meaningful sense.”); see also Ex parte James, 836
So.2d 813, 819 (Ala. 2002) (“Continuing the descent from the abstract to the concrete, we now recognize that any specific remedy that the judiciary could impose would, in order to be effective, necessarily involve a usurpation of that power entrusted exclusively to the Legislature. Accordingly, compelled
by the authorities discussed above – primarily by our duty under § 43 of the Alabama Constitution of
1901 – we complete our judicially prudent retreat from this province of the legislative branch in order
that we may remain obedient to the command of the people of the State of Alabama that we ‘never
exercise the legislative and executive powers, or either of them; to the end that it may be a government
of laws and not of men.’”) (emphasis in original); Marrero v. Commonwealth of Pa., 739 A.2d 110,
113-14 (Pa. 1999) (“[W]hat constitutes an ‘adequate’ education or what funds are ‘adequate’ to support
such a program . . . are matters which are exclusively within the purview of the General Assembly’s
powers, and they are not subject to intervention by the judicial branch of our government.”); City of
Pawtucket v. Sundlun, 662 A.2d 40, 59 (R.I. 1995) (noting that, in attempting to define what constitutes
a “thorough and efficient” education under the New Jersey Constitution, “the New Jersey Supreme
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such as New Hampshire, have treated it as self evident that questions regarding educational adequacy are justiciable.31
III. AN ABRIDGED CLAREMONT CHRONOLOGY
At the center of the Claremont case is Part II, Article 83 of the State
Constitution, which in part provides that:
Knowledge and learning, generally diffused through a community,
being essential to the preservation of a free government; and
spreading the opportunities and advantages of education through
the various parts of the country, being highly conducive to promote this end; it shall be the duty of the legislators and magistrates, in all future periods of this government, to cherish the interest of literature and the sciences, and all seminaries and public
schools . . .32
Despite the enigmatic nature of a “duty” that involves “cherish[ing] the
interest of” a number of things including public schools,33 the New Hampshire Supreme Court in 1993 held that this “language commands, in no
uncertain terms, that the State provide an education to all its citizens and
that it support all public schools.”34
The Court further held, despite the lack of any direct or indirect mention of qualitative or quantitative measures, that “[A]rticle 83 imposes a
duty on the State to provide a constitutionally adequate education to every
educable child in the public schools in New Hampshire and to guarantee
adequate funding,”35 that there is a “corresponding right of the citizens to

Court has struggled in its self-appointed role as overseer of education for more than twenty-one years,
consuming significant funds, fees, time, effort, and court attention. The volume of litigation and the
extent of judicial oversight provide a chilling example of the thickets that can entrap a court that takes
on the duties of a Legislature”).
31. See Claremont II, 703 A.2d at 1360. See also Lake View Sch. Dist. No. 25 of Phillips County v.
Huckabee, 2005 Ark. LEXIS 776 (Dec. 15, 2005) (“This court’s refusal to review school funding under
our state constitution would be a complete abrogation of our judicial responsibility and would work a
severe disservice to the people of this state. We refuse to close our eyes or turn a deaf ear to claims of
a dereliction of duty in the field of education.”); Rose, 790 S.W.2d at 211 (“In spite of any protestations
to the contrary, we do not engage in judicial legislating. We do not make policy. We do not substitute
our judgment for that of the General Assembly. We simply take the plain directive of the Constitution,
and, armed with its purpose, we decide what our General Assembly must achieve in complying with its
solemn constitutional duty.”).
32. N.H. Const. pt. II, art. 83.
33. See Clayton P. Gillette, Reconstructing Local Control of School Finance: A Cautionary Note, 25
Cap. U. L. Rev. 37 (1996) (describing mandate to cherish as “inherently nebulous”).
34. Claremont I, 635 A.2d at 1378.
35. Id. at 1376.
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its enforcement,”36 and that “[a]ny citizen has standing to enforce this
right.”37 The Court, however, did not “define the parameters of the education mandated by the constitution as that task is, in the first instance, for
the legislature and the Governor.”38
In Claremont II, which was issued in 1997, the New Hampshire Supreme Court decided that defining the parameters of educational adequacy
was not a task for the representative branches after all. The Court struck
down a definition of educational adequacy developed by the State Board of
Education,39 and said instead it would “look to the seven criteria articulated
by the Supreme Court of Kentucky [in the Rose decision] as establishing
general, aspirational guidelines for defining educational adequacy.”40
These so-called “general, aspirational guidelines” are:
(1) sufficient oral and written communication skills to enable students to function in a complex and rapidly changing civilization;
(2) sufficient knowledge of economic, social, and political systems
to enable the student to make informed choices;
(3) sufficient understanding of governmental processes to enable
the student to understand the issues that affect his or her community, state, and nation;
(4) sufficient self-knowledge and knowledge of his or her mental
and physical wellness;
(5) sufficient grounding in the arts to enable each student to appreciate his or her cultural and historical heritage;
(6) sufficient training or preparation for advanced training in either
academic or vocational fields so as to enable each child to choose
and pursue life work intelligently; and
(7) sufficient levels of academic or vocational skills to enable public school students to compete favorably with their counterparts in
surrounding states, in academics or in the job market.41
The Court added that it “anticipated” that the representative branches
would “promptly develop and adopt specific criteria implementing these
guidelines.”42
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.

Id. at 1381.
Id.
Id.
Claremont II, 703 A.2d at 1357-58.
Id. at 1359.
Id.
Id.
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In Claremont II, the Court also changed the nature of the funding duty
from guarantor to provider, as it held that “[t]o the extent that the property
tax is used in the future to fund the provision of an adequate education, the
tax must be administered in a manner that is equal in valuation and uniform in rate throughout the State.”43 The Court also gave the representative branches a grace period to replace the extant funding system, which
relied heavily on the local property tax.44
The Court also held that a “constitutionally adequate public education
is a fundamental right.”45 Because “the fundamental right at issue is the
right to a State funded constitutionally adequate public education,”46 the
legislature could allow school districts “to dedicate additional resources to
their schools.”47 The Court saw it as “basic,” however, that the State must
assure “comparable funding.”48
In Claremont IX, the New Hampshire Supreme Court issued an advisory opinion that reiterated the change in the nature of the State’s funding
duty. It opined that proposed legislation that relied on local property taxes
to fund some of the legislatively defined cost of educational adequacy
would “directly contradict the mandate of Part II, Article 83, which imposes upon the State the exclusive obligation to fund a constitutionally
adequate education.”49
The Court also gratuitously opined that educational adequacy had “yet
to be defined,”50 despite the enactment of RSA 193-E:2 in 1998, which
essentially codified the “general, aspirational guidelines” handed down in
Claremont II.51 For good measure, the Court added that “[i]t is not possible to determine the level of funding required to provide the children of

43. Id. at 1357.
44. Id. at 1360 (stating that “the present funding mechanism may remain in effect through the 1998
tax year”). At the time, “[l]ocally raised real property taxes [were] the principal source of revenue for
public schools, providing on average from seventy-four to eighty-nine percent of total school revenue.”
Id. at 1354.
45. Id. at 1359. It is noteworthy that in Claremont I the court had said that “a free public education
is at the very least an important, substantive right,” which is a lower level right under equal protection
analysis than a fundamental right. 635 A.2d at 1381. Claremont II does not attempt to explain how, in
the intervening four years, the right to an education grew from a substantive right to a fundamental
right.
46. Claremont II, 703 A.2d at 1359.
47. Id. at 1360.
48. Id. This makes the Claremont case a hybrid of equity and adequacy theory. Every school district must receive comparable state funding, which is equity theory, but school districts may use local
taxes to increase the level of funding, which avoids the political problems experienced in Vermont with
equity litigation. Supra n. 25.
49. Claremont IX, 765 A.2d at 676.
50. Id. at 677.
51. See N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. §193-E2 (1998). In 2005, RSA 193-E:2 was re-titled , “Criteria for an
Equitable Education.” However, the criteria remain unchanged.
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this State with a constitutionally adequate education until its essential elements have been identified and defined.”52
In Claremont XI, the Court held that “accountability is an essential
component of the State’s duty.”53 It explained that:
Accountability means that the State must provide a definition of a
constitutionally adequate education, the definition must have standards, and the standards must be subject to meaningful application
so that it is possible to determine whether, in delegating its obligation to provide a constitutionally adequate education, the State has
fulfilled its duty.54
The Attorney General, who since 1999 has taken the position that the
Claremont case “mandated” accountability, argued that extant statutes and
regulations satisfied this “mandate.”55 The Court, however, held that the
“existing statutory scheme has deficiencies that are inconsistent with the
State’s duty to provide a constitutionally adequate education.”56
The Court held that certain education regulations known as the “minimum standards”57 for school approval were “in clear conflict with the
State’s duty to provide a constitutionally adequate education” to the extent
they “excuse noncompliance solely based on financial conditions.”58 Accordingly, to this extent, the minimum standards were deemed “facially
insufficient.”59 The Court also was critical of the New Hampshire Educa52. Claremont IX, 765 A.2d at 677.
53. Claremont XI, 794 A.2d at 745.
54. Id. at 751.
55. Id. at 752. The Attorney General previously had “characterized Claremont II as issuing four
mandates: ‘define an adequate education, determine the cost, fund it with constitutional taxes, and
ensure its delivery through accountability.’” Id. at 749. Claremont II, however, says nothing about
either delivery or accountability. Moreover, as long as adequate funding is being provided, the duty is
being met. Therefore, it should not matter constitutionally whether the legislature “determined” the
cost of an adequate education or picked a number from a hat. Similarly, as long as an adequate education is being provided, it should not matter constitutionally whether it is being delivered through accountability or through UPS. The court properly chose not to base its holding in Claremont XI on this
“concession,” as the Attorney General cannot bind the legislature. Id. at 750-51. Instead, it reasoned
that “meaningful” “standards of accountability” were required because “[i]f the State cannot be held
accountable for fulfilling its duty, the duty creates no obligation and is no longer a duty.” Id. at 751.
The manifest problem with this reasoning is that the constitution does hold the representative branches
accountable for its education policy choices, albeit to the voters not the court, as the legislature and
governor must stand for reelection every two years.
56. Id. at 745.
57. N.H. Admin. R. Ann. 306.01 (2006). The “minimum standards” are minimum only in the sense
that they are required for State approval for student attendance and state funding. They are quite extensive and detailed.
58. Claremont XI, 794 A.2d at 755.
59. Id. The court had never before used the phrase “facially insufficient” to describe a law or regulation’s constitutional status. While it sounds like “facially unconstitutional,” it is a completely different animal. A facially unconstitutional challenge to a legislative act is “the most difficult challenge to
mount successfully” and to succeed “the challenger must establish that no set of circumstances exists
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tion Improvement and Assessment Program (“NHEIAP”) because the Department of Education “is limited to using the results [of assessment tests]
to encourage school districts to develop a local education improvement and
assessment plan,” which the Court felt was not a “meaningful” application
of assessment tests.60 Borrowing language that had been suggested by the
Attorney General, the Court “conclud[ed] that the State ‘needs to do more
work.’ ”61
In sum, the New Hampshire Supreme Court’s interpretation of Article
83 has made the provision of a homogeneous public education through a
centralized command-and-control system, which has the Supreme Court at
its helm, the constitutional law of New Hampshire.
IV. CLAREMONT AND THE SEPARATION OF POWERS
Part I, Article 37 of the New Hampshire Constitution requires that governmental powers be separated between the three branches of government:
In the government of this state, the three essential powers, to wit,
the legislative, executive and judicial, ought to be kept as separate
from, and independent of, each other, as the nature of a free government will admit, or as is consistent with that chain of connection that binds the whole fabric of the constitution in one indissoluble bond of union and amity.62

under which the Act would be valid.” U.S. v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 745 (1987); see State v. Brobst,
857 A.2d 1253, 1255 (N.H. 2004) (discussing overbreadth doctrine). “Facial insufficiency” appears to
mean that the challenger simply must show that the law was not written the way the court would have
written it.
60. Claremont XI, 794 A.2d at 758.
61. Id. at 759. The Attorney General’s view of the respective roles of the branches was that the
representative branches “are responsible for crafting and implementing a long-term solution to the
problems with the educational funding system found by this Court. The Court is responsible for deciding whether the Legislature has adopted a satisfactory definition and for determining that the Legislature has finished its initial tasks under Claremont II, or that it needs to do more work.” Id. Thus, in the
view of the Attorney General, the judiciary’s role is to tell the legislature how high to jump, while the
legislature’s role is to jump that high.
62. N.H. Const. pt. I, art. 37. In Claremont V, the court, apparently frustrated that nearly a year had
passed since the issuance of Claremont II, during which time “the legislature has primarily put its
efforts into the consideration of legislation (the ABC plan) that was determined to contain an unconstitutional funding mechanism and proposed constitutional amendments designed to nullify in whole or in
part this court’s decisions in Claremont I and Claremont II,” intimated that the “chain of connection”
language meant it could act to fund public education in the absence of legislative action. 725 A.2d at
650, 652. Such a construction of Part I, Article 37 of the New Hampshire Constitution would be the
proverbial exception that swallows the rule because by the same reasoning the legislature could exercise judicial powers if it felt the court was not meeting its constitutional duties. What this language
refers to is one branch exercising a power that is of a nature that belongs to another branch, where
expressly provided by the constitution. One example is Part II, Article 38 of the New Hampshire
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As the New Hampshire Supreme Court has explained, this “[s]eparation of
the three co-equal branches of government is essential to protect against a
seizure of control by one branch that would threaten the ability of our citizens to remain a free and sovereign people.”63
The Court has utilized the “political question” doctrine developed by
the federal courts to prevent judicial violation of the separation of powers.64 Among other circumstances, a case involves a nonjusticiable political question “where there is a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a coordinate political department; or a lack of judicially discoverable and manageable standards for resolving it.”65
A. Text and Structure
If the separation of powers means anything, it means that one branch
of government cannot exercise powers that are textually committed by the
constitution to another branch. Yet that is exactly what a judicially enforceable duty to provide an adequate education and provide adequate
funding entails, because the constitution commits these matters to the representative branches.
The “power of the purse” is textually committed to the legislature as
the constitution gives only the legislature the power to raise taxes,66 and
only money that the legislature has appropriated can be spent.67 In general,
it has long been understood that, under the separation of powers, when and
how to exercise the “power of the purse” is exclusively a legislative call.68
Indeed, that is one of the reasons why some have seen fit to refer to the
judiciary as the “least dangerous branch.”69
Constitution, which provides that the senate “shall be a court” for impeachments. N.H. Const. pt. II,
art. 38; see also The Federalist No. 47, 249 (James Madison) (George W. Carey & James McClellan
eds., 2001).
63. In re Governor and Exec. Council, 846 A.2d 1148, 1154 (N.H. 2004) (quoting In re Mone, 719
A.2d 626, 631 (N.H. 1998).
64. Baines, 876 A.2d at 774-75 (citing Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 209 (1962)).
65. Hughes, 876 A.2d at 743 (quoting In re Judicial Conduct Comm., 751 A.2d 514, 516 (N.H.
2000)).
66. N.H. Const. pt. I, art. 28; N.H. Const. pt. II, art. 5.
67. N.H. Const. pt. II, art. 56.
68. See Robert C. Byrd, The Control of the Purse and the Line Item Veto Act, 35 Harv. J. on Legis.
297, 300 (1988) (“The Framers’ decision to invest the Legislative Branch with the control over the
purse was neither arbitrary nor novel. Rather, in assigning the Legislature the power of the purse, the
Framers were relying on their familiarity with the lessons of Roman, English, and colonial history; with
the history of the American states prior to the adoption of the Constitution; and with English and continental political theory.”).
69. See The Federalist No. 78, supra n. 62 (Alexander Hamilton) (“Whoever attentively considers
the different departments of power must perceive, that, in a government in which they are separated
from each other, the judiciary, from the nature of its functions, will always be the least dangerous to the
political rights of the Constitution; because it will be least in a capacity to annoy or injure them. The
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The New Hampshire Supreme Court has recognized that the separation
of powers would be violated if the judiciary were to attempt to require the
legislature to make a particular type of appropriation. Indeed, only eight
years prior to Claremont I, the Court had held that Part I, Article 18, which
in relevant part provides that the “true design of all punishments being to
reform, not to exterminate mankind,” did not authorize the superior court
to order the State to provide a college education to a State prison inmate.70
Rather, the “superior court exceeded its jurisdiction” because, in part, the
judiciary “cannot violate the separation of powers by invading the right of
the legislature to appropriate money for prison programs. . . .”71
Any remedy for an alleged deprivation of “adequate funding” would
require a court to order the State to spend money that the legislature has
not appropriated, which would violate Part II, Article 56.72 Thus, there
cannot be a judicially enforceable duty to provide adequate funding.
The power to make education policy is just as obviously textually
committed to the legislative branch. The constitution vests the “supreme
legislative power” in the legislature,73 and gives the legislature “full power
and authority” to make laws.74 Consequently, to use the Supreme Court’s
own words, “[a]ny educational policy or rule declared by the legislature or
promulgated under authority delegated by it may not be reversed or vacated judicially on the ground that it must be regarded as impolitic.”75
Yet that is precisely what the Supreme Court did in Claremont II,
when it struck down a definition of educational adequacy developed by the
State Board of Education. The Court contended that it struck down the
State Board’s definition because the definition did not “sufficiently reflect
the letter or spirit of the State Constitution’s mandate.”76 However, the
Executive not only dispenses the honors, but holds the sword of the community. The legislature not
only commands the purse, but prescribes the rules by which the duties and rights of every citizen are to
be regulated. The judiciary, on the contrary, has no influence over either the sword or the purse; no
direction either of the strength or of the wealth of the society; and can take no active resolution whatever. It may truly be said to have neither FORCE nor WILL, but merely judgment; and must ultimately
depend upon the aid of the executive arm even for the efficacy of its judgments.”).
70. State v. Evans, 506 A.2d 695, 697 (1985) (quoting N.H. Const. pt. I, art. 18).
71. Id. at 699. The court also ruled that judiciary could not violate the separation of powers by
invading “the right of the executive to devise and implement rehabilitative and educational programs at
the State prison.” Id.
72. See N.H. Const. pt. II, art. 56. “No moneys shall be issued out of the treasury of this state, and
disposed of, (except such sums as may be appropriated for the redemption of bills of credit, or treasurer’s notes, or for the payment of interest arising thereon) but by warrant under the hand of the governor for the time being, by and with the advice and consent of the council, for the necessary support and
defense of this state, and for the necessary protection and preservation of the inhabitants thereof,
agreeably to the acts and resolves of the general court.” Id.
73. N.H. Const. pt, II, art. 2.
74. Id. at art. 5.
75. Coleman v. School Dist. of Rochester, 183 A. 586, 589 (N.H. 1936).
76. Claremont II, 703 A.2d at 1357.
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Court did not explain what it was about the definition that was not sufficiently reflective of the constitutional mandate except that “in the first instance, it is the legislature’s obligation, not that of individual members of
the board of education, to establish educational standards that comply with
constitutional requirements.”77 This explanation is unconvincing.
For one thing, the Court’s precedent established that it was constitutional for the legislature to delegate authority to administrative agencies,
such as the Board of Education, as long as it provided “some standards or
general policy to guide the administrative agency. . . .”78 The Court suggested that the authority to define educational adequacy could not similarly
be delegated because the “constitution places the duty to support the public
schools ‘on the legislators and magistrates.’”79 But that simply begs the
question why the legislature did not have the discretion to carry out its duty
by delegating to the State Board the authority to define “adequacy.” Additionally, under this reasoning, the legislature should be prohibited from
delegating any aspect of the duty to provide an adequate education, which
as later Claremont decisions make clear, is not the case.80
For another thing, if the problem was that the legislature could not
delegate the task of defining educational adequacy, then the Court did not
need to “look to” the Kentucky parameters, as all that the representative
branches would need to do to meet their “obligation” “to establish educational standards that comply with constitutional requirements,”81 would be
to directly enact the Board of Education’s definition or another definition.
The conclusion that the Supreme Court simply wanted to define adequacy
itself is inescapable.
This conclusion is further supported by the language of Part II, Article
83. As noted earlier, there is no mention of any qualitative standard of
education. Rather, the duty is simply to “cherish the interest of literature
and the sciences, and all seminaries and public schools. . . .”82 A very
strong case can be made that this language is hortatory.83 At best, this language is what commentators call “Category I” constitutional language,84
77. Id. at 1358.
78. In re Strandell, 562 A.2d 173, 178 (N.H. 1989).
79. Claremont II, 703 A.2d at 1357 (quoting N.H. Const. pt. II, art. 83).
80. See Claremont XI, 794 A.2d at 751 (standards of accountability must allow the Court “to determine whether, in delegating its obligation to provide a constitutionally adequate education, the State
has fulfilled its duty”).
81. Claremont II, 703 A.2d at 1358.
82. N.H. Const. pt. II, art. 83.
83. See Van Loan, supra n 8.
84. See Thro, supra n. 12, at 605-06 (“In some states, ‘Category I’ clauses impose a legislative duty
which is met by simply establishing a public school system. In other states, ‘Category II’ clauses
require that the system be of a specific quality or have some characteristic such as ‘uniformity.’ The
‘Category III’ education clauses go beyond the specific quality level of Category II and set up the
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and “merely mandate[s] some system of free public schools with no requirement as to support or quality.”85 But whether the language is hortatory or mandatory, it is impossible to read as requiring the multifarious
“guidelines” enumerated in Claremont II. Instead, such a reading can
fairly be described as “a display of stunning judicial imagination.”86
Claremont II’s holding that it was unconstitutional to use the local
property tax to fund an adequate education was also politically based.
Whether the tax was constitutional depended upon how the taxing district
was delineated.87 If it was delineated as the school district, as the trial
court had defined it, then the rate and assessment would be uniform, and
the tax would be constitutional. On the other hand, if the taxing district
was delineated as the entire State, as the Supreme Court delineated it, then
the tax would be unconstitutional because rates and assessments varied
between school districts.
Because the purpose of the local property tax was to meet the State’s
duty to provide an adequate education, the Supreme Court reasoned that it
was a State tax.88 Again, the problem with this reasoning is that it is purely
results oriented as it offers no satisfactory explanation why the State can
delegate other aspects of its educational duties, but not the funding aspect.
It also fails to explain why various other duties that the State delegates to
municipalities can be funded with local property taxes when, in theory,
they are also State duties.89
Another problem with this reasoning is that it is inconsistent with how
the Court had described the State’s funding duty in Claremont I. There,
the Court said that the duty was to “guarantee adequate funding,”90 which
school system for a specific purpose. Finally, in the few states with ‘Category IV’ clauses, education is
the ‘primary,’ ‘fundamental’ or ‘paramount’ duty of the state legislature.”). Note that Thro incorrectly
classifies New Hampshire as a Category IV state as there is no language in Part II, Article 83 describing public education as a “primary,” “fundamental” or “paramount” duty. Id. at 606. Thro, however,
correctly describes the Massachusetts education clause (which is a “nearly identical provision regarding
education,” Claremont I, 635 A.2d at 1378) as a Category I clause, “which cannot be regarded as
imposing a quality standard.” Thro, supra n. 12, at 611.
85. Jon Mills & Timothy McLendon, Setting a New Standard for Public Education: Revision 6
Increases the Duty of the State to Make “Adequate Provision” for Florida Schools, 52 Fla. L. Rev.
329, 344 (2000).
86. Hancock v. Commr. of Educ., 822 N.E.2d 1134, 1160 (Mass. 2005) (Cowin, J., concurring).
87. See Susan E. Marshall, The New Hampshire State Constitution: A Reference Guide 121 (Praeger
2004) (“The legislative authority to impose taxes is limited by the constitutional requirement that they
be ‘reasonable and proportional.’ Reasonable and proportional taxes are equal in valuation and uniform in rate. . . . To have a uniform valuation and uniform rate, a tax must be uniform throughout the
taxing district, so that a state tax must be uniform throughout the state, a county tax throughout the
county, and a town tax throughout the town.”) (citations omitted).
88. Compare Claremont II, 703 A.2d at 1356, with Holt v. Antrim, 9 A. 389, 389 (N.H. 1886) (“Local education is a local purpose for which legislative power may be delegated to towns.”).
89. See Claremont II, 703 A.2d at 1363 (Horton, J., dissenting).
90. Claremont I, 635 A.2d at 1376.

File: Mosca - 4 Pierce L. Rev. 411

2006

Created on: 6/7/2006 11:16:00 PM

Last Printed: 6/11/2006 9:19:00 PM

CLAREMONT AND THE SEPARATION OF POWERS

423

connotes a role where the State, acting as a guarantor, would assure that
less affluent school districts have sufficient funding, as opposed to paying
for the entire cost of an adequate education in all school districts. Thus,
the Supreme Court, in order to strike down the extant education funding
system, changed the nature of the State’s duty from the guarantor of adequate funding to its exclusive provider.91
It is not just the constitution’s delineation of governmental powers that
compels the conclusion that education policymaking is textually committed
to the representative branches. Article 83 does so as well as it makes the
duty one for “the legislators and magistrates.”92 If the language “shall be
the duty . . . to cherish” is no mere statement of aspiration, but “commands,
in no uncertain terms,”93 then it necessarily follows that the language “shall
be the duty of the legislators and magistrates” commands every bit as unequivocally “that the duty be fulfilled by the legislative and executive
branches, without oversight or intrusion by the judiciary.”94
Despite the clear textual commitment of education policymaking to the
legislature, the Supreme Court has, under the guise of interpreting the constitution, played the role of a “super” legislature from the outset. While
Claremont I’s declination to “define the parameters of the education mandated by the constitution”95 may sound like deference to the representative
branches, it is not.
Assuming for the sake of argument that Article 83 “imposes on the
State a duty to provide a constitutionally adequate education to every child
in the public schools in New Hampshire and to guarantee adequate funding,”96 it nonetheless is quite an interpretive leap to conclude that this duty
requires that State government define an adequate education, and that it
define adequacy in a one-size-fits-all manner. For example, it is certainly
arguable that a more efficacious way to develop the parameters of a quality
of public education is by letting school districts function as laboratories of
91. See also Claremont IX, 765 A.2d at 677 (stating that it is “the State’s obligation to underwrite
the cost of an adequate education for each educable child”). The hostility of the Supreme Court to
property taxes in general can be seen in Claremont X, where the Court came within one vote of declaring the statewide property tax unconstitutional. See 780 A.2d 494.
92. See N.H. Const. pt. II, art. 41 (referring to Governor as “supreme executive magistrate”).
93. Claremont I, 635 A.2d at 1378.
94. Hancock, 822 N.E.2d at 1160 (Cowin, J., concurring). There are other examples that demonstrate that the Court’s treatment of the language of Part II, Article 83 has been inconsistent. For example, it is not just public schools that the legislators and magistrates have a duty to “cherish” but “seminaries” and “the interest of literature and the sciences.” N.H. Const. pt. II, art. 83. Yet the Court has
given no effect to this language. The reason cannot be that the language is too ambiguous because the
Court previously stated that the framers understood seminaries to mean colleges. See Sisters of Mercy
v. Town of Hooksett, 42 A.2d 222, 225 (N.H. 1945).
95. See Claremont I, 635 A.2d at 1381 (declining to define educational parameters because “that
task is, in the first instance, for the legislature and the Governor”).
96. Id. at 1376.
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education policy and develop their own separate definitions97 or by letting
market forces do so through school choice.98
Telling the representative branches that they have the “task” of defining an adequate education, in a decision purporting to interpret the constitution, is simply an insidious way of ordering the legislature to pass a certain type of legislation. If the text of the constitution means anything,
however, it is the legislature’s call as to what level of government should
be responsible for defining an adequate education and indeed whether there
should be a governmental definition of an adequate education at all. While
the Court’s declination in Claremont I to “define the parameters of the
education mandated by the constitution” may sound like deference to the
representative branches, it is not.
The representative branches’ compliance with Claremont I emboldened the Court. In Claremont II, the Court struck down the State Board of
Education’s definition, announced its own “general, aspirational guidelines
for defining educational adequacy,” and indicated that it anticipated the
representative branches “will promptly develop and adopt specific criteria
implementing these guidelines. . . .”99 Thus, the legislature’s role had been
reduced to implementing a program of public education that reflected the
Court’s policy views.
Subsequent cases involved increased judicial micro-managing of education policy. In Claremont IX, even though the definition of an adequate
education was not before it, the Court opined that the legislative definition,
which essentially codified the Claremont II guidelines, was insufficient,
and indicated that the definition should be written at a level of detail from
which its cost could be determined.100 In Claremont XI, the Court held that
the duty to provide an adequate education required “standards of accountability.”101 Because the extant statutes and regulations were not sufficiently “meaningful,”102 the State “need[ed] to do more work,”103 which is
a fetching euphemism for rewriting the minimum standards and the
NHEIAP to the Court’s liking.

97. See Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 50 (“An analogy to the Nation-State relationship in our federal
system seems uniquely appropriate. Mr. Justice Brandeis identified as one of the peculiar strengths of
our form of government each State’s freedom to ‘serve as a laboratory; and try novel social and economic experiments.’ No area of social concern stands to profit more from a multiplicity of viewpoints
and from a diversity of approaches than does public education.”) (citation omitted).
98. See Jennifer L. Smith, Educational Vouchers in Indiana – Considering the Federal and State
Constitutional Issues, 34 Val. U. L. Rev. 275 (1999).
99. 703 A.2d at 1359.
100. 765 A.2d at 677.
101. 794 A.2d at 745.
102. Id. at 758.
103. Id. at 759.
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Critiquing the legislature in this manner is clearly beyond the scope of
how the Supreme Court had previously characterized judicial review,
which simply “authorizes courts to determine whether a law is constitutional, not whether it is necessary or useful.”104 Thus, the court “simply
compares the legislative act with the constitution; [and] since the constitution clearly cannot be adjudged void, the courts have no choice but to declare any act which is inconsistent with it to be of no effect.”105
While one would never know it from reading the Claremont case, there
are differences of opinion regarding how best to improve public education.
The divide is political not legal. Those on the conservative side of the political spectrum typically favor the principle of subsidiarity, which pushes
decision making down to the lowest possible level.106 Accordingly, school
districts, rather than the State, should run public schools, while parents
should be able to choose their children’s schools.107 Those on the liberal
side of the political spectrum typically favor centralization of education
policy and oppose school choice.108 Interpreting Article 83 to require a
single definition of educational adequacy for the entire State and uniform
standards of accountability is simply a political judgment, that centralized
bureaucratic control of public education is better policy than local control
and school choice, camouflaged as constitutional law.
The structure of the constitution also belies the assertion that Article 83
imposes any judicially enforceable duty on state government to provide an
adequate education. Part I, the Bill of Rights, specifically enumerates limitations on governmental power. To name a few examples, government
cannot take away our firearms,109 prevent us from exercising the religion of
our choice,110 take our property without just compensation,111 or prevent us
104. State v. LaFrance, 471 A.2d 340, 343 (N.H. 1983).
105. Id. See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 178 (1803) (“So if a law be in opposition to the constitution; if both the law and the constitution apply to a particular case, so that the court must either decide
the case conformably to the law, disregarding the constitution; or conformably to the constitution,
disregarding the law; the court must determine which of these conflicting rules governs the case. This
is of the very essence of judicial duty.”).
106. See N.H. Republican St. Comm., 2005-2006 Republican Party Platform, http://www.nhgop.org/
resources/platform.html#edu (“Local control of education policy and education funding creates the
best-managed school systems.”) (accessed May 22, 2006).
107. See id. (“Laws should be implemented to encourage school choice and competition and allow all
parents to choose the best public, private, charter or home school program for their children.”).
108. See N.H. Democratic Party, 2004 New Hampshire Democratic Party Platform,
http://www.nhdp.org/platform/platform.asp#EDUCATION (“We believe in the primacy of public
education and oppose attempts to reduce the public commitment to all schools. . . . We require that the
State Board of Education develop policies for the benefit of local boards that outline our collective
concept of adequacy in public education.”) (platform is no longer available on the listed website and a
copy of the original website is on file with the Pierce Law Review).
109. N.H. Const. pt. I, art. 2-a.
110. Id. at art. 5.
111. N.H. Const. pt. I, art. 12.
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from ventilating our opinions.112 Part II, the Form of Government, in contrast, divides governmental powers between the three branches without
specifically enumerating how to exercise those powers.113
Moreover, it expressly provides that the legislature has “full power and
authority” to make “all manner of wholesome and reasonable” laws “as
they may judge for the benefit and welfare of this state.”114 The Supreme
Court has construed this language to mean that “courts may not declare
acts of the Legislature void on the sole issue whether they are ‘wholesome
and reasonable.’ The Legislature is to judge whether they are for ‘the
benefit and welfare’ of the state.”115 It would be incongruous with this
structure, which precludes some governmental actions but does not require
any actions, leaving it to the branch most responsive to the people to determine what is for “the benefit and welfare of this state,” to interpret Article 83 to impose a judicially enforceable duty on the legislature to design
and implement a curriculum based on qualitative guidelines provided by
the Supreme Court and to enact and utilize “standards of accountability”
that the Court deems “meaningful.”
B. Judicially Discoverable and Manageable Standards
Another characteristic exhibited by cases that involve nonjusticiable
political questions is “a lack of judicially discoverable and manageable
standards” for resolving the question.116 The need for such standards in
adequacy litigation is obvious as courts must determine what level of education is adequate and how much funding is necessary to reach that level.
Perhaps the biggest problem a court attempting to develop such standards
faces is that the relationship between school performance and funding is
hardly the self-evident proposition that the Claremont case, and adequacy
doctrine in general, assumes. Rather, “there are significant theoretical and
empirical disputes as to the importance of finance in the delivery of a quality education.”117

112. Id. at art. 22.
113. N.H. Const. pt. II, art. 2 (legislative power); id. at art. 41 (executive power); id. at art. 72-a
(judicial power).
114. Id. at art. 5.
115. Coleman, 183 A. at 586.
116. Hughes, 876 A.2d at 743.
117. Obhof, supra n. 27, at 595; see also W. Lance Conn, Funding Fundamentals: The Cost/Quality
Debate in School Finance Reform, 94 Educ. L. Rep. 9, 10 (1994) (“Despite over two hundred studies in
nearly thirty years, educational researchers have not yet shown convincingly that school expenditures
are related to educational achievement in any systematic way.”); see generally Michael Heise, The
Courts, Educational Policy, and Unintended Consequences, 11 Cornell J.L. & Pub. Policy 633, 656 n.
148 (2002) (collecting articles).
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Perhaps the paradigmatic example that it is not just love, but adequacy
as well, that money cannot buy is the Missouri v. Jenkins desegregation
case.118 The United States District Court, since 1985, had issued remedial
orders designed to desegregate the Kansas City Missouri School District by
creating “magnet schools” to attract white students.119 The “massive expenditures” ordered by the District Court financed, among other things, airconditioned classrooms, a 2,000-square-foot planetarium, green houses and
vivariums, a twenty five-acre farm with an air-conditioned meeting room
for one hundred and four people, a Model United Nations wired for language translation, broadcast capable radio and television studios with an
editing and animation lab, a temperature controlled art gallery, movie editing and screening rooms, a 3,500-square-foot dust-free diesel mechanics
room, 1,875-square-foot elementary school animal rooms for use in a zoo
project, and swimming pools.120 The per pupil cost far exceeded the costs
in any other school district in Missouri.121 Yet “student achievement levels
were still at or below national norms at many grade levels.”122 Mercifully
for the taxpayers of Missouri, in 1995 the United States Supreme Court put
an end to the District Court’s spending spree.123
Nevertheless, various “cost studies” have been developed to determine
the cost of an adequate education.124 A majority of states, including New
Hampshire, have undertaken such studies voluntarily in response to education funding litigation.125 In a few states, the studies were ordered by the
courts.126 The most popular types of cost studies are “professional judgment” and “successful schools.”127
Professional judgment is just that, as it defines the cost of an adequate
education as what “experts” believe it costs to provide either their own

118. 515 U.S. 70 (1995).
119. Id. at 76-77.
120. Id. at 79.
121. Id.
122. Id. at 100 (internal quotation omitted).
123. Id. at 102-03.
124. See e.g. James E. Ryan & Thomas Saunders, Foreword to Symposium on School Finance Litigation: Emerging Trends or New Dead Ends?, 22 Yale L. & Policy Rev. 463, 475 (2004) (“[R]eliance on
costing-out studies promises to be one of the most important trends in school finance litigation over the
next decade.”); Steve Smith, Education Adequacy Litigation: History, Trends, and Research, 27 UALR
L. Rev. 107, 114 (2004) (“[W]ith courts across the country finding education systems unconstitutional,
the next logical step was to create some type of rationale or methodology to determine adequate funding levels”).
125. See generally Campaign for Educ. Equity, Costing Out, http://www.schoolfunding.info/policy/
CostingOut/overview.php3 (accessed May 22, 2006) (providing background on the response to costbased educational equity litigation) (original website on file with the Pierce Law Review).
126. Id. These states were Arizona, Arkansas, New York, Ohio and Wyoming. Id.
127. Janet D. McDonald et al., School Finance Litigation and Adequacy Studies, 27 UALR L. Rev.
69, 93 (2004); Ryan & Saunders, supra n. 124, at 476-77.

File: Mosca - 4 Pierce L. Rev. 411

428

Created on: 6/7/2006 11:16:00 PM

PIERCE LAW REVIEW

Last Printed: 6/11/2006 9:19:00 PM

Vol. 4, No. 3

vision of an adequate education, State standards, or some other measure.128
Successful schools studies define the cost of an adequate education as average spending among schools or school districts meeting selected benchmarks.129 Despite the multiplicity of approaches, what all cost studies have
in common is that they are completely arbitrary.
Consider the initial education funding law passed in response to
Claremont II.130 It was based on a cost study prepared by Augenblick &
Myers, Inc. using the successful schools approach.131 The study identified
school districts in which forty to sixty percent of the third and sixth grade
students had proficiency ratings of “Basic” or better on the State’s standardized NHEIAP tests.132 The sample was then reduced to the school
districts that accounted for the fifty percent of the students with the lowest
base costs,133 which was defined as per pupil expenditure less costs for
special education, summer school, all costs reimbursed by federal funds,
and various other costs.134 The per pupil cost of an adequate education was
calculated based on the average base cost among these school districts.135
In 1999 this number was $3,669.00.136 This figure was then reduced by a
9.75 percent discount factor to produce a $3,311.00 per pupil cost of an
adequate education, which was used to determine the amount of State
funding.137

128. Deborah A. Verstegen, Towards a Theory of Adequacy: The Continuing Saga of Equal Educational Opportunity in the Context of State Constitutional Challenges to School Finance Systems, 23
St. Louis U. Pub. L. Rev. 499, 503 (2004).
129. R. Craig Wood & Bruce D. Baker, An Examination and Analysis of the Equity and Adequacy
Concepts of Constitutional Challenges to State Education Finance Distribution Formulas, 27 UALR
L. Rev. 125, 145 (2004).
130. N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 198:40 (1999) (repealed 2005).
131. 1998 N.H. Laws 321 (Chapter 267:1); see Campaign for Educ. Equity, New Hampshire Fact
Sheet, http://www.schoolfunding.info/states/nh/costingout_nh.php3 (accessed May 22, 2006) (outlining
the calculations and recommendations of the study) (original website on file with the Pierce Law Review).
132. N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 198:40(I)(b)(1) (repealed 2005). The NHEIAP ranks students in one of
four categories: Novice, Basic, Proficient, or Advanced. N.H. Dept. of Educ., NHEIAP FAQ,
http://www.ed.state.nh.us/education/doe/organization/curriculum/Assessment/nheiapFAQs.htm
(accessed May 22, 2006) (original website on file with the Pierce Law Review). Districts where more than
sixty percent of the students scored at the Basic or better levels were excluded on the ground that they
were providing more than an adequate education, while districts where fewer than forty percent of the
students scored Basic or better were excluded on the ground that they were not providing an adequate
education. Douglas E. Hall & Richard A. Minard, Jr., Plumbing the Numbers #7 School Finance
Reform: Trends & Unintended Consequences 5 (N.H. Ctr. for Pub. Policy Stud. April 2003) (also
available at http://www.unh.edu/nhcpps/plumbing/plumbing7.pdf).
133. N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 198:40(I)(b)(2) (repealed 2005).
134. Id. at § 198:40(I)(a) (repealed 2005).
135. Id. at § 198:40(I)(b)(3) (repealed 2005).
136. Hall & Minard, supra n. 132, at 5.
137. Id. at 7.
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In Claremont VII, the plaintiffs urged the Supreme Court to write the
9.75 percent discount factor out of the formula because it lacked a “sufficient legal basis.”138 The plaintiffs were correct about the pedigree of the
discount factor as it was a plug by the legislature to keep the total cost of
an adequate education at $825 million.139 But under that standard of review every other component of the formula could be found wanting as
well. The definition of base cost, the choice of the NHEIAP tests, the
choice of the “Basic” proficiency rating, and the selection of school districts where forty to sixty percent of students score at “Basic” or better are
also not legally based.
For example, the only answer to why the sample should be school districts where forty to sixty percent of students score at “Basic” or better on
the NHEIAP tests is that an “expert” says so. What is a court to do then
when such a cost study is challenged as unconstitutional and a different
expert testifies that in order to determine the cost of an adequate education
the sample should be school districts where fifty to seventy percent of students score at or above “Proficient,” or that base cost should be defined
differently, or that a professional judgment study showed that per pupil
expenditures should be $8,000.00 higher?140 There certainly is no legal
standard to guide the court.
Another shared attribute of cost studies is that they are unreliable because they ignore the numerous other variables affecting education performance besides funding, such as the competence of administrators, the
quality of teachers, the talents and motivations of students, and the involvement of parents.141 Because of these variables, the cost of an adequate education necessarily varies not just by school district or by school
but by student. Accordingly, in order to reliably calculate the cost of an
138. 744 A.2d at 1108.
139. Hall & Minard, supra n. 132, at 7 n. 3.
140. A study relied on by the plaintiffs at the trial court level in the Massachusetts Hancock case
argued that the per pupil cost of an adequate education was $13,000, which was nearly $8,000 higher
than spending in one of the target school districts. Hancock ex rel. Hancock v. Driscoll, 2004 WL
877984 at *121 (Mass. Super. 2004). The trial court did not find the study “helpful” because it represented “to some extent a wish list of resources that teachers and administrators would like to have if
they were creating an ideal school with no need to think about cost at all” and because “the context in
which this study was conducted – a lawsuit involving funding issues for the very districts in which the
panel members teach and work – gives one pause about its total objectivity.” Id.
141. See Michael Heise, Litigated Learning and the Limits of Law, 57 Vand. L. Rev. 2417, 2446
(2004) (“[W]hat is reasonably clear is that something as complex as student academic achievement
almost assuredly does not pivot on any single variable, such as funding, teacher quality, racial composition, or class size.”); see also Eric A. Hanushek, When School Finance “Reform” May Not Be Good
Policy, 28 Harv. J. on Legis. 423, 438 (1991) (“[T]he aggregate data provided by the 187 separate
estimates lead relentlessly to the conclusion that, after family backgrounds and other educational inputs
are considered, differences in educational expenditures are not systematically related to student performance.”).
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adequate education, the calculation must be done on a student-by-student
basis and the calculation must account for the particular effect of nonfinancial variables on each student’s performance. Until somebody comes
up with a cost study that does so, the best that can be said about cost studies is that they provide equal State funding per student.
But even if the cost of an adequate education could be determined,
education funding is not something that can be considered in isolation because education is just one of many services that State and local government provide. There are no judicially discoverable and manageable standards for determining how much of the State’s budget can be devoted to
public education without compromising the ability of State and local government to enforce environmental regulations, maintain public health programs, or provide for the public safety, to name just a few examples.142
Thus, education funding is an issue that belongs in the Statehouse, not the
courtroom.
There also are no judicially discoverable and manageable standards for
determining what level of education is an adequate education. Ironically,
the Claremont case illustrates that the question is thoroughly political.
Claremont I seemed to hold out some hope that the New Hampshire
Supreme Court would leave the making of education policy to the legislature to a greater degree than other state supreme courts which had also held
that their states’ constitutions imposed duties to provide and fund an adequate education. Unlike these courts, which immediately proceeded to
define educational adequacy,143 the Claremont I court declined to “define
the parameters of the education mandated by the constitution as that task
is, in the first instance, for the legislature and the Governor.”144 Of course,
which branch would control education policy would hinge upon what the
Supreme Court intended to do “in the second instance.” On the one hand,
if the court’s review were restricted to determining whether the definition
is “inadequate,” for example, a thirty percent literacy rate,145 then the legis142. Education funding litigation seeks to override the political process by imposing a higher value
on education spending than on other government spending. The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts recently refused to hold that the Commonwealth was under-funding education “[b]ecause decisions about where scarce public money will do the most good are laden with value judgments, those
decisions are best left to our elected representatives.” Hancock, 822 N.E.2d at 1156.
143. Rose, 790 S.W.2d at 212-13; McDuffy v. Sec. of the Exec. Off. of Educ., 615 N.E.2d 516, 554
(Mass. 1993). Note that in Hancock the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts backed away from
using the Kentucky “capabilities” as the lodestar for whether the Commonwealth was providing an
adequate education. 822 N.E.2d at 1153. Rather, “McDuffy . . . did not mandate any particular program of public education, [and the] seven ‘capabilities’ listed in Rose do not in themselves prescribe a
specific curriculum.” Id.
144. 635 A.2d at 1381.
145. Cf. Chiles, 680 So. 2d at 409 (Overton, J., concurring) (“While ‘adequate’ may be difficult to
quantify, certainly a minimum threshold exists below which the funding provided by the legislature
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lature would retain the primary role in setting education policy.146 If, on
the other hand, the review were to involve determining whether the legislative definition of adequacy is, well, adequate, then the court would be at
large in the field of education policy and the branches’ roles would be reversed.
Claremont II’s “aspirational guidelines” made it clear that henceforth
the Supreme Court intended to take the primary role in setting education
policy.147 Justice Horton, who had been part of the unanimous Claremont I
decision, dissented because, “[m]y problem is that I was not appointed to
establish educational policy, nor to determine the proper way to finance the
implementation of this policy. Those duties, in my opinion, reside with the
representatives of the people.”148
Horton argued that the majority had defined “general adequacy” when
all that Part II, Article 83 required was “Constitutional adequacy.”149 The
former was a question to be left to the political branches because “it is
clear that one man’s adequacy is another’s deficiency.”150 Reasoning that
the scope of the duty was coterminous with the purpose of Part II, Article
83, and that the purpose was found in the language, “the preservation of a
free government,” Horton concluded that there is constitutional adequacy
“if the education provided meets the minimum necessary to assure the
preservation of a free government.”151 He then proceeded to define “constitutional adequacy” as “reading, writing, and mathematics . . . exposure
to history and the form of our government, [and] the first three elements of
the Kentucky standard adopted by the majority, but not necessarily the
balance.”152
The majority, of course, had a different take on things. “We agree
with Justice Horton that we were not appointed to establish educational
policy. . . . That is why we leave such matters, consistent with the Consti-

would be considered ‘inadequate.’ For example, were a complaint to assert that a county in this state
has a thirty percent illiteracy rate, I would suggest that such a complaint has at least stated a cause of
action under our education provision.”).
146. While this approach makes the court’s role critic, as opposed to chef, it still does not provide a
manageable standard of review because inadequacy, like pornography, would depend on the eye of the
beholder. See Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964) (Stewart, J., concurring) (“[U]nder the First
and Fourteenth Amendments criminal laws in this area are constitutionally limited to hard-core pornography. I shall not today attempt further to define the kinds of material I understand to be embraced
within that shorthand description; and perhaps I could never succeed in intelligibly doing so. But I
know it when I see it, and the motion picture involved in this case is not that.”).
147. 703 A.2d at 1359.
148. Id. at 1361 (Horton, J., dissenting).
149. Id.
150. Id.
151. Id. at 1362.
152. Id. at 1361-62.
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tution, to the two co-equal branches of government.”153 The majority’s
rebuttal, at best, simply assumes what needs to be proven.154 Moreover, it
is belied by their “aspirational guidelines,” which leave the legislature no
room to establish education policy.155 Rather, all that is left is for the legislature to “promptly develop and adopt specific criteria implementing these
guidelines.”156
While Horton criticizes the majority for setting education policy, his
approach represents a difference in degree, not in kind, from the majority’s. Limiting the scope of the duty to providing the education “necessary
to assure the preservation of a free government” may theoretically reduce
the number of potential answers to the question, what is an adequate education, but it does not convert that question from a political question into a
legal question.
For example, Horton “would include in the constitutional standard the
first three elements of the Kentucky standard adopted by the majority, but
not necessarily the balance.”157 But whether knowledge of economics
(element two) is more important to the preservation of a free government
than knowledge of the arts (element five) is a matter of opinion.
Additionally, the Kentucky criteria contain other elements that might
be deemed necessary to the preservation of a free government. For example, one might reasonably believe that “vocational training” is as necessary
to preserving a free government as “written communication skills.” And
one might reasonably believe that skills that do not appear in the Kentucky
criteria – such as sufficient physical fitness to serve in the armed forces –
are essential to preserving a free government.158 Just as “one man’s adequacy is another’s deficiency,” what type of education is “the minimum
necessary to preserve a free government” is also a matter of opinion. Both
are political questions.
Ironically, the majority’s description of the nature of an adequate public education shows how political the question is:
A constitutionally adequate public education is not a static concept
removed from the demands of an evolving world. It is not the
153. Id. at 1360 (majority).
154. Note that the majority’s profession of deference to the representative branches is qualified by the
phrase “consistent with the Constitution,” which the majority had just interpreted to require the representative branches to “develop and adopt specific criteria implementing” the Kentucky guidelines. Id.
at 1359.
155. See id. (defining “educational adequacy” according to the Kentucky “aspirational guidelines”).
156. Id.
157. Id. at 1362 (Horton, J., dissenting).
158. See e.g. Paul Cartledge, The Spartans 32 (Overlook Press 2003) (discussing the Agoge, the
system of compulsory education in Sparta).
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needs of the few but the critical requirements of the many that it
must address. Mere competence in the basics – reading, writing,
and arithmetic – is insufficient in the waning days of the twentieth
century to insure that this State’s public school students are fully
integrated into the world around them. A broad exposure to the
social, economic, scientific, technological, and political realities of
today’s society is essential for our students to compete, contribute,
and flourish in the twenty-first century.159
If an “adequate public education is not a static concept removed from the
demands of an evolving world,”160 which I agree it is not, then whether the
public schools are providing an adequate education is not something that
judges can discover by recourse to the text of the constitution, the Supreme
Court’s precedents,161 or history.162 Rather, it is a question of policy to be
answered by the elected branches.163
Of the three branches of government, the judiciary is the least institutionally suited to adjusting education policy to “the demands of an evolving world.” The judiciary must wait for the appropriate lawsuit to set education policy. The legislature, in contrast, is able to change education policy as often as necessary. And while a judge only gets to hear the views of
the litigants’ “experts,” the legislature can listen to anyone it thinks might
be helpful. If it “is not the needs of the few but the critical requirements of
the many that [an adequate education] must address,”164 then the body
159. Claremont II, 703 A.2d at 1359.
160. Id.
161. If anything, precedent indicates that the constitution does not impose a judicially enforceable
duty upon the State to provide and fund an adequate education. See Fogg v. Bd. of Educ., 82 A. 173,
174-75 (N.H. 1912) (“The primary purpose of the maintenance of the common school system is the
promotion of the general intelligence of the people constituting the body politic and thereby to increase
the usefulness and efficiency of the citizens, upon which the government of society depends. Free
schooling furnished by the state is not so much a right granted to the pupils as a duty imposed upon
them for the public good.”); Holt, 9 A. at 389 (“Local education is a local purpose for which legislative
power may be delegated to towns.”).
162. History also indicates that the constitution does not impose a judicially enforceable duty upon
the State to provide and fund an adequate education. As the Supreme Court noted in Claremont I, “no
State funding was provided at all for education in the first fifty years after ratification of the constitution.” 635 A.2d at 1381; see also Walter A. Backofen, Claremont’s Achilles’ Heel: The Unrecognized
Mandatory School-Tax Law of 1789, 43-1 N.H. B. J. 26 (Mar. 2002) (discussing the Law of 1789, in
effect until 1919, which provided neither equal nor adequate funding for public schools).
163. See Marrero, 739 A.2d at 112 (“The Constitution ‘makes it impossible for a legislature to set up
an educational policy which future legislatures cannot change’ because ‘the very essence of this section
is to enable successive legislatures to adopt a changing program to keep abreast of educational advances.’ It would be no less contrary to the ‘essence’ of the Constitutional provision for this Court to
bind future Legislatures and school boards to a present judicial view of a constitutionally required
‘normal’ program of educational services. It is only through free experimentation that the best possible
educational services can be achieved.”).
164. Claremont II, 703 A.2d at 1359. I cannot help pointing out that the “[i]t is not the needs of the
few but the critical requirements of the many” language sounds a lot like Mr. Spock’s last words to
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elected by and regularly accountable to the many, the legislature, is its
logical expositor.165
Ironically, the crown jewel of the Claremont case, its “standards of accountability,” illustrates why judges should leave education policymaking
to the representative branches. The legislature will not be able to use standards to generate improvement by purposefully making standards hard, or
even impossible, to achieve without running the risk that schools will be
deemed inadequate for not attaining such standards. Consequently,
Claremont may well result in lower standards and a lower level of education performance than would otherwise be the case. Public school students
may get an adequate education, but that is all that they will get.
V. CONCLUSION
The New Hampshire Supreme Court has said that the separation of
powers requires that it “be as zealous in protecting the rights of the other
coequal branches” as it is in protecting its own rights.166 Because there is a
textually demonstrable commitment of education funding and education
policy to the legislative branch, and because what an adequate education
comprises and costs are quintessentially political questions, Claremont
represents a clear trespass on legislative powers and should be overruled.
If Claremont is not overruled, then it is about time that the representative
branches take to heart James Madison’s words in The Federalist No. 49,
“[t]he several departments being perfectly co-ordinate by the terms of their
common commission, none of them, it is evident, can pretend to an exclusive or superior right of settling the boundaries between their respective
powers,” 167 and start acting like co-equals.

Admiral Kirk in Star Trek II: “Do not grieve, Admiral. . . . It is logical. . . . The needs . . . of the many
. . . outweigh . . . the needs of the few.” Star Trek II: The Wrath of Khan (Paramount 1982) (motion
picture).
165. It should come as no surprise, then, that if “taken literally, there is not a public school system in
America that meets” Claremont II’s aspirational guidelines. William E. Thro, A New Approach to
State Constitutional Analysis in School Finance Litigation, 14 J.L. & Pol. 525, 548 (1998); see also
Obhof, supra n. 27, at 595 (describing the guidelines as “essentially useless”).
166. Evans, 506 A.2d at 699.
167. The Federalist No. 49, supra n. 62 (James Madison).

